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"For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics."
0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897)1
"Economic analysis is not a single great searchlight that will pene-
trate and illuminate every nook and cranny of the law[.]"
Charles J. Goetz, Law and Economics (1984)2
I. INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, law and economics 3 were separate disciplines.
The former evolved from classical philosophy, providing a method for
normative reinforcement developed over the generations. The latter
blossomed from applied mathematics and a need to understand the
mechanisms of early, rapidly-developing commodities markets.
Though hard to imagine in retrospect, the acorn from which law and
economics grew fell squarely on the law side of the fence, with law
providing the initial network of problems and solutions that many
twentieth century economists sought to improve.4
The application of economic principles by scholars and judges
progressed quickly from 1880 through 1960, with mathematical formu-
las devised to examine the existence of a duty in negligence cases,5 the
magnitude of damages in contract disputes,6 and the concepts of copy-
rights7 and option contracts.8 These applications were of two distinct
1. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
2. CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (1984).
3. "A unified theoretical framework capable of accounting for a large variety of different
kinds of phenomena has been established as a regulative ideal of economic inquiry. This has
further ramifications for the expansion of economics to the domains of neighboring disciplines,
as in the much disputed 'economics imperialism."' Uskali Maki, Realistic Realism About Unreal-
istic Models, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS (Harold Kincaid &
Don Ross eds., 2009).
4. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL. I. THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
6. See Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
26 YALE L.J. 169 (1917); William F. Fritz, "Underliquidated" Damages as Limitation of Liability,
33 TEX. L. REV. 196 (1954). For the state of the art in this area, see Tai-Yeong Chung & Alan
Chan, Contract Damages and Investment Dynamics (Econometric Soc'y Far E. Meetings, Work-
ing Paper No. 683, April 2004), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ecmI/feam04/683.html.
7. See Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585 (1956). Debate con-
tinues as to the compatibility of common law concepts and law and economics frameworks - for
instance, whether the "bundle of rights" conception of property is complete and accurate in an
economic sense. See Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property 6, 7 (Univ.
of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 423, August 2008) (arguing that "bundle of rights"
approach is correct and complete approach to describing property rights).
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categories: evolutions of balancing tests and evolutions of economic
calculations. In the first group, a question was normally resolved with
a balancing test, such as whether the alleged tortfeasor had a duty,
which was reduced to a formula where, if B9 was less than P * L,10 a
duty existed." In the latter group, one finds a variety of efforts to
adapt economic calculations invented for finance, valuation, or ac-
counting purposes to solving questions as to civil damages. In both,
the goal is to replace speculation with certainty, to replace semantics
with formulas,12 and to find accepted, concrete methodologies for cal-
culating the result of a controversy. As the race to replace art with
science progressed, however, several important questions were aban-
doned along the way.
Law and economics has become a beautiful mirage in the desert of
legal uncertainty, alleged to prescribe, rather than simply describe, the
relationships between legal principles and economic theories. By re-
placing the legislator with the calculator, making legal rules with slide
rules, new economically "efficient" laws may better represent the
data, but poorly represent the people. Never before have so many
learned scholars at so many respected institutions broadly advocate
replacing the reasonable person with the invisible hand. Economics
and law is a young mixture, the result dependent upon the method
used to blend the two. The role of neoliberal "freshwater" economists
in structuring this merger has set its recipe and altered its flavor.13
But there are issues this primarily Chicago School thrust of the law
and economics movement either cannot address or has failed to fore-
see. If the present is merely fluctuation and inefficiency as the world
bounces toward a settled equilibrium, perhaps a broader approach is
warranted to attempt to understand the imperfect present, rather than
a future state of equilibratory bliss. The state of the art in law and
8. See Charles S. Lyon, Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950,51 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1951).
9. In Learned Hand's "calculus of negligence" as explained in Carroll Towing, "B" represents
the burden of taking precautions to prevent the plaintiff's loss. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at
173.169.
10. The term "P * L" is an expression of the probability of loss multiplied by the gravity of
that loss. Id.
11. Cf Robert D. Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causa-
tion, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 523 (1987).
12. The evolution of legal terms of art defined by economic principles is a fascinating contem-
porary trend and a topic too rich to be explored in detail here. For example, "joint profit" in
modern property law, which is the productive uses added together, less the negative externalities
each inflicts on the other, less integral transaction costs. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 100 (3d ed. 2000).
13. For an excellent summary of the neoliberal position and its growing popularity, see DAVID
S. GREWAL, NETWORK POWER, 247-265 (Yale Univ. Press 2008).
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economics must move from being a loose network of unfalsifiable the-
ories to a concrete discussion involving many viewpoints with a suc-
cessful society -not an efficient transaction- at its center.
II. LAw & EcoNoMIcs: THE FIRST CRUSADES
The interaction of law and economic concepts in the legal tradition
of the late nineteenth century dated back to at least the German ref-
ormation; tragedies of the commons were to be avoided; where a
party could be improved without hurting any other parties, this was
desirable and unanimously agreeable logic was superior to unilateral,
despotic decrees. These seemingly simple and universal concepts led,
however, to a road never before traveled in human history (or West-
ern jurisprudence). While these ideas evolved in the lakes of fresh-
water1 4 economic thought, they are now pervasive throughout
academic institutions of all persuasions. Throughout this Article,
"traditional" or "mainstream" law and economics refers to analysis
from a freshwater, neoliberal, libertarian position.
A. Coase and Calabresi
The central texts in the early evolution of what we describe today as
law and economics are, almost without question, Ronald Coase's The
Problem of Social Cost15 and Guido Calabresi's Property Rules, Lia-
bility Rules, and Inalienability.16 As Lewis17 had done in the previous
century,18 Coase1 9 and Calabresi focused on the creation, appraisal,
14. "Freshwater" economics refers to the laissez-faire, efficiency prioritized approach of the
University of Chicago, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Rochester, and other uni-
versities near bodies of freshwater. "Saltwater" economics, meanwhile, refers to the more pol-
icy-driven Keynesian approach of Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale
University. See Alan Beattie, Humbling Lessons for Bickering Economists, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2009 at 9.
15. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1961).
16. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
17. See JOHN LEWIs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 55 (1888).
18. The work of Carl Menger and Werner Stombart predates this work, but, by modern stan-
dards, is more in the realm of law and political philosophy than law and economics.
19. Coase's mentor, Arnold Plant, studied the economic implications of the rise of intellectual
property.
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and destruction of economically valuable rights in property. 20 These
texts were chiefly analytical, academic, and apolitical. 21
B. Becker and Posner
The University of Chicago is the epicenter of the first modern
(twentieth century) movement in law and economics. At Chicago,
Henry Simons22 and Aaron Director 23 led a charge to implant eco-
nomic principles deep into the heart of legal thought. Under Direc-
tor's leadership, Gary Becker 24 and Richard Posner25 drew upon and
interpreted the work of Coase and Calabresi's, as well as others. 26 At
the same time the torch was being passed from Calabresi to Posner, H.
Scott Gordon was publishing work on the dilemma of finite re-
sources,27 which flourished into the core arguments for environmental
stewardship law in the twenty-first century.28
C. Pareto Efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, and Associated
Building Blocks and Improvement Paradigms
Most calculations of efficiency begin from one of two starting
points: either transaction cost as a discount from perfect efficiency or
opportunity cost calculated by examining the value of the subject op-
tion relative to particular outside options. Assumptions about trans-
action cost 2 9 and opportunity cost give rise to models in areas as
diverse as stock options and labor unions. Because the universe of
20. This remains a central focus of study in law and economics. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Prin-
ciple, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
21. Though his work is considered to generally bolster conservative political positions and
conservative fiscal policy, Calabresi was nominated to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit by President Bill Clinton, a Democrat.
22. See HENRY C. SIMONs, EcoNOMIc POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1948).
23. Professor, The Law School, The University of Chicago. Founder, The Journal of Law &
Economics.
24. Professor, The University of Chicago (Economics, Sociology, The Booth School of Busi-
ness). Laureate, The Nobel Prize in Economics (1992).
25. Senior Lecturer, The Law School, The University of Chicago. Judge, The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (C.J., 1993-2000).
26. Particularly Robert Cooter and Henry Manne.
27. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECoN. 124 (1954); Scott Gordon, Economics and the Conservation Question, 1
J.L. ECON. 110 (1958).
28. For news from the border between the law and economics movement and the environmen-
tal law movement, see Bruce Pardy, The Hand Is Invisible, Nature Knows Best, and Justice Is
Blind: Markets, Ecosystems, Legal Instrumentalism, and the Natural Law of Systems, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 67 (2008).
29. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386-405 (1937) (tracing evolu-
tion of firms to efficiencies achieved in lower transaction costs).
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outside options is limited in conventional decision-making models,30
and not all implications of each choice may be known at the time the
decision is made,31 the real costs may be difficult to weigh ex ante.
These trade-offs are often (erroneously) valued as a function of the
best alternative's marginal efficiency or productivity when compared
to the "next-best" alternative. 32 Put another way, trade-offs are val-
ued in terms of whether marginal improvements can be made by mak-
ing a different available choice at the same point in time, even when
that choice (if made at the same time) may be impracticable or in-
volve agency costs.
Law and economics created a set of tools for evaluating trade-offs,
much as Learned Hand had in Carroll Towing decades earlier.33 One
of the questions that quickly emerged was whether Pareto improve-
ments3 4 could be made through legislation, legal rules, or procedural
safeguards. The Pareto improvement paradigm can be seen in a wide
variety of favorite topics in law and economics, from efficient breach35
to labor relations. 36
Very quickly, the question of what improvements are possible in a
"harmless" set of exchanges came under fire.37 Courts in the United
States are courts of law and equity, and the most economically elegant
legal rule may not produce "fair" or philosophically appealing results.
Though it may be tempting to separate the forging of law and the
finesse of policy for the sake of academic discourse, this is a dishonest
practice if the debate is to yield any valuable fruit.38
30. When choosing between A and B, often C or the option to do nothing at all are not
considered.
31. This is a primary criticism of Pareto efficiency as a law and policymaking tool, as discussed
infra.
32. This is similar to the "admissible decision rule" in decision theory or the valuing of adja-
cent nodes in Bayesian analysis.
33. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
34. A Pareto improvement, in economics, is a move toward Pareto efficiency. If one has re-
sources to allocate among a set of subjects and resources can be re-allocated in a way that im-
proves the situation of one subject without harming the situation of any other subject, this is a
Pareto improvement.
35. See Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame A Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349
(2009); cf Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1989).
36. See Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisc. Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942); see also Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 474-77 (1955) (summarizing factors
used in labor relations cases from WWII to 1955).
37. For Calabresi's most comprehensive salvo in this ongoing academic debate, see Guido
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1221-27
(1991) (discussing Kaldor-Hicks and dismissing existence of information parity required to ana-
lyze Pareto improvements ex ante).
38. "I crave the law" (as opposed to equity). WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF
VENICE act 4, sc. 1, line 142 (Shylock).
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Assume the world contains eleven economic agents and that all
agreed-upon contracts, debts, and barters between them have been
satisfied in full. The world has reached an equilibrium where no ex-
change can occur where the marginal benefit enjoyed from the ex-
change exceeds the marginal cost required; there are no discrete
allocative inefficiencies that can be identified. At time to, one agent
has 99% of the world's resources, the others 0.1% each. It is not pos-
sible to make any of the ten inferior agents "better" in ti (in Pareto
terms) without taking from the wealthiest agent.39 Yet, most would
agree the distribution of resources among the eleven at to may not be
optimal. From a policy standpoint, "Pareto optimal" is not synony-
mous with "unimprovable."
Hence, in many policy-centered law and economics circles, the con-
cept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has replaced Pareto efficiency as the
metric for acceptable incremental improvements. Under Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency, an outcome is considered incrementally more effi-
cient where those who enjoy gains can40 compensate any parties who
are put in a less desirable position.41 One of the core weaknesses of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a law and economics tool is that it manages
distributions nicely, but in complete ignorance of the breadth of the
curve. So, for instance, in a welfare model Kaldor-Hicks improve-
ments may offer theoretical advantages that do not raise the standard
of living of any of the people involved. 42 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is
also non-symmetric43 and non-exclusive. 44 Most problematic of all, it
is unclear what "settlement price" the disadvantaged individuals
would demand in compensation from the advantaged individuals, or
how this price would be reached.45
39. "It is twice blest; It blesseth him that gives and him that takes." Id. at lines 184-85
(Portia).
40. The key word here is "can" and not "will." Kaldor-Hicks improvements consider whether
the improved party could compensate any parties disadvantaged, not whether such compensa-
tion would actually flow from one party to another.
41. As may be obvious to many readers at this point, just as squares are rectangles but rectan-
gles are not always squares, Pareto improvements are Kaldor-Hicks improvements, but not vice
versa.
42. See TIBOR SCITOVSKY, PAPERS ON WELFARE AND GROWTH (1964); JOHN F. O'CONNELL,
WELFARE ECONOMic THEORY (1982).
43. Tibor Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. OF ECON. STuo. 77,
77-88 (1941).
44. "Exclusive" here is used in the game theory sense rather than the mathematical sense. In
other words, "A dominates B" does not mean that B cannot dominate A.
45. Some claim this price must be built into wholesale regulation, as in a Pigovian tax or
Pigovian subsidy, while others claim this price could be privately negotiated (as in the case of
class action lawsuits) or set in an auction market (as in the case of carbon dioxide emissions
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To understand the weaknesses in the way many economists visualize
improvements, one must first understand where and how the concept
of "improvement net of transaction cost" was born. In
microeconomic analysis, improvements are scrutinized after deducting
their transaction costs; in other words, if the cost of making a change
outweighs the benefits of that change, the change is not net-positive or
an "improvement." While this sounds logical, in practice it is difficult
to measure (and even harder to predict) actual costs associated with
any action. The idea of transaction cost, in mainstream American ec-
onomics, has been seen as a discount from perfect efficiency: a wrinkle
in otherwise perfect markets. In truth, transaction costs are woven
into the very fabric of markets and are rarely bilateral or simple in
nature.4 6 To illustrate this, consider a typical example.
State is a government, while party corporation is a corporate entity
involved in manufacturing asbestos. State has instituted a pollution
trading system in which State determines the quantity of harmful ma-
terial emitted from party corporation's factory and party corporation
buys coupons from State (or in the market) equivalent to its level of
harmful material emissions. While this appears to be a simple bilat-
eral transaction, the underlying exchange does nothing to account for
harm to party corporation's customers, workers, and others, nor the
cost to society in health care costs, increased litigation, and
remediation.
Transaction costs are, then, only a subset of the entirety of costs.
Broadly considered costs are often overwhelmingly large, exceedingly
hard to predict ex ante, and unlikely to be something third parties are
eager to finance. Returning to the example, the overall costs of party
corporation throughout the twentieth century include costs stemming
from environmental damage, health costs, and litigation. The margi-
nal benefit to the firm from each ounce of asbestos sold would have to
be almost unimaginably immense to offset these factors. 4 7 However,
the information disparity (ignorance as to the health issues associated
with asbestos) would make it almost impossible for even the keenest
economist to foresee the firm's trajectory (or to craft appropriate
legislation).
rights). See W. J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307
(1972).
46. Many have criticized law and economics scholars for ignoring or unrealistically discount-
ing the importance of transaction costs. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic
and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987).
47. Robert C. Post, Constitutional Scholarship in the United States, 7 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 416,
422 (2009) ("[L]aw and economics is driven by its own internally generated telos of efficiency, it
is relatively unresponsive to the evolution of political commitments").
[Vol. 8:107
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The question at the macro-policy level, then, becomes why one ac-
tion is better than any other, or better than no action at all. Further,
one must ask how much utility individuals will enjoy both individually
and collectively. Since cardinal utility theory48 has fallen into disuse,
new theories evolved in order to allow for incremental positive adjust-
ments (Pareto improvements, for instance). But these new and im-
proved methodologies 49 for ameliorating society at large pay no
attention to addressing any individual's utility and satisfaction.50
While cardinal utility theory may have been flawed in its specifics,
modern non-parametric or ordinal rankings of utility are simply not
fine-grained enough for the resulting indifference curves5' to accu-
rately portray individuals' choices. The modern law and economics
movement attempts to address entire systems far from what were seen
as market behaviors throughout most of the twentieth century, 52 and
far from the level at which individual actors perceive adjustments.
H. Scott Gordon noted this problem in the context of environmen-
tal regulation in the first issue of the Journal of Law and Economics. 53
While macro-level comprehensive models are seductive simplifica-
tions, the individual has the opposite perception problem. 54 It is diffi-
cult for the fisherman to see the impact of the single marginal fish
48. Cardinal utility theory dictates that the utility an individual enjoys from a good or service
can be quantified and compared (in ratios and formulas) with the utility of other possible distri-
butions goods, services, and resources. Cardinal utility theory, in the strictest sense, fell out of
favor in the latter part of the twentieth century.
49. "New" here refers to the "new" law and economics, rather than the "old" law and eco-
nomics of the 1950s and before. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53
TEx. L. REV. 757 (1975) (discussing "new" versus "old" movements in law and economics).
50. "No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the mem-
bers are poor and miserable." ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
51. An indifference curve, in economics, is the convex curve along which the subject will con-
sume any combination of X and Y, with diminishing marginal utility for either at the tails of the
curve. Tracing the indifference curve, one finds the marginal rate of substitution, or the rate at
which an actor would be willing to have less Y in exchange for more X, and vice versa. Because
the universe of options available to the individual is seldom bound or describable in a two-
dimensional function, indifference curves are often seen as useful, but inherently flawed, descrip-
tions of the choices actors in the marketplace might make. See DAVID COLANDER,
MICROECONOMIcs 325-39 (8th ed. 2009).
52. For instance, crimes, breaches of contract, torts, and procedural attributes of controversies
were generally seen as extra-market events, rather than inputs. See Charles K. Rowley, Public
Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, LAW AND EcoNoMIcs 125 (Nicholas Mercuro ed.,
1989).
53. H. Scott Gordon, Economics and the Conservation Question, I J. L. ECON. 110 (1958).
54. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 27, 30 (1690). For a more modern
subject of analysis, see CORMAc HERLEY & DINEI FLORENCIO, A PROFITLEss ENDEAVOR:
PHISHING AS TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS (2008), http://research.microsoft.comlen-us/um/
people/cormaclPapers/PhishingAsTragedy.pdf.
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until there are no more fish to be caught.55 Because gradual change is
difficult to observe and because the degree to which trailing indicators
lag is equally difficult to estimate,56 even relatively specialized prefer-
ence models may not fit individual perceptions or activities.57
III. THE ILLUSION OF UNANIMITY
Many judges seem to consider economists as a bloc, a herd of inter-
changeable voices with methodologies so settled and identical that any
inconsistent outcome is surely erroneous. As a result, the conclusion
of one or a few economists comes to be routinely attributed to "econ-
omists" in general.58 Yet, in courtrooms and classrooms across the
country, law and economics was, and to some extent still is, seen as a
monolithic thrust from one direction, without dissent.59
According to various scholars and courts, economists believe, for
instance, that generally accepted index methods for estimating infla-
tion both overstate 60 and understate61 changes in the cost of living.
55. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
56. See The Sun Also Rises, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 25.
57. Matthew Dolan, Corey Boles & Josh Mitchell, 'Cash for Clunkers' Runs Out of Gas,
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2009 (discussing high-profile 2009 government program aimed at encourag-
ing specific transaction among specific set of consumers, yet still underfunded by billions of
dollars).
58. See, e.g., Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (aff'd in
part, rev'd in part) (discussing what "most economists" believe with no trailing citation); Scari-
ano v. Justices of Sup. Ct. of State of Ind., 47 F.3d 173, 174 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that "most economists" believe minimum competence of lawyers is best protected
through "free competition among lawyers," with no citation or reference to authority); Nielsen
v. United States, 976 F.2d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing what "most" economists believed
as to Brazilian hyperinflation crisis with no trailing citation). But see F.T.C. v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 47 n.58 (D.D.C. 1988) (Green, J.) (explaining view of "most economists" as
to Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with adequate support and explanation). Only when claims at-
tributed to the entirety of economists are particularly outrageous do the courts seem to take
notice. See, e.g., United States v. McHenry, 951 F.2d 364, 1991 WL 278830, at*2 (C.A.9 (Ariz.)).
(court questioned claims by defendant, purveyor of silver dollars, that "economists believe in-
vesting in silver dollars is one of the most secure investments") (quoting court's restatement of
defendant's claims).
59. This trend arguably originated at the University of Chicago, with Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law, first published in 1972. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1972). The book portrays the rules of society at common law as a search for economic effi-
ciency among actors with disparate motives and interests. The book's introduction at law
schools, including Chicago, was the first exposure to any interdisciplinary thought about law and
economics for many law students in the 1970s and early 1980s.
60. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98, 143 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (court discussing
what "many economists believe"); Ogden v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., No. 06-11721-BC, 2007 WL
1675092, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2007) (examining assertion regarding what "many, if not
most, economists believe").
61. See the methodology proposed by Dr. Bassett in Sauers v. Alaska Barge, 600 F.2d 238, 246
n.15 (9th Cir. 1979). See also the court's unusual methodology for computing wages in terms of
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Rather than an entire mob of economists being confused whether use
of the CPI factors overstates or understates change in the cost of liv-
ing, there is disagreement among economists. Yet, an idea that "econ-
omists" think about complex problems in a uniform way and come to
unanimous conclusions persists. The illusion of a unanimous set of
beliefs from economists, beliefs quite rarely in conflict with the beliefs
of the judge authoring the opinion in question, is a troubling facet of
law and economics where the former speaks on behalf of the latter
when convenient.
IV. THE REAGAN ERA: OF WELFARE QUEENS AND
OTHER MYTHS
Reagan repeatedly told tales of abuses at the edge of the system,
from abuse of the welfare system62 to poor Latin American govern-
ance.63 These are, no doubt, powerful images that tend to reinforce
certain political views 64 and stereotypes.65 It was Reagan's opinion
that market forces could be put to work to rein in subsidies and sub-
stantially narrow the effect of programs like welfare; this was in es-
sence a Chicago approach. 66
Not surprisingly, Reagan nominated 67 Robert H. Bork as a candi-
date for Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1987.
The last major article Bork had written prior to his nomination was
what sorts of bonds an investor in a given income tax bracket might invest in O'Shea v. Riverway
Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). Cf O'Shea, 677 F.2d 1194 (holding
authored by Posner involving wage increases) with Malcom B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can
Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert?, 34 AKRON L. REV. 795, 843-44 (describing Posner's
use of delta-in-cost-of-living calculations in case involving price increases).
62. See "Welfare Queen" Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1976, at
51; see also Paul Krugman, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 2007, at A23 ("Reagan
repeatedly told the bogus story of the Cadillac-driving welfare queen").
63. See JOHN PRADOs, PRESIDENTs' SECRET WARS: CIA AND PENTAGON COVERT OPERA-
TIONS FROM WORLD WAR 11 THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF 395-99 (1996) (as to Nicaragua).
The Iran-Contra affair and Reagan's approach to Latin American policy filled all major newspa-
pers in the fourth quarter of 1986.
64. Though most voters, particularly conservative Republicans, likely interpreted the story to
portray an African-American woman, "African-Americans have never constituted a majority of
those on welfare." Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune, New Lyrics?, 11
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 389, 392 (2004).
65. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., The "Welfare Queen" Experiment: How Viewers React to Images
of African-American Mothers on Welfare (UCLA, Research on Media Coverage, Paper No. 007,
1999).
66. George L. Priest, The Rise of Law and Economics: A Memoir of the Early Years, in THE
ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 350 (Francesco Parisi &
Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005).
67. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2411-90 (1987) (testimony of
witness panel 12, including testimony of the Author).
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The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics.68 Conservative econo-
mists quickly realized Bork's generally non-interventionist views on
antitrust could offer an opportunity for a conservative shift on other
law and economics issues.69 This was likely a sound bet, as Bork and
Easterbrook70 had taken up the broad efficiency position71 of the Chi-
cago School 72 in a series of articles.73 Though some doubt whether
the Chicago School positions of this era truly changed the law,7 4 the
positions certainly foreshadowed the direction of law and economics,
which would generally be characterized by conservative-leaning, non-
interventionist,75 and laissez-faire, pro-free-trade positions.76
A. Welfare as a Beachhead in Labor Economics
Welfare and the minimum wage have been key issues for politicians
looking to the law and economics movement for support. While the
wage debate has evolved substantially since the 1970s and early
1980s,7 the welfare debate has remained an active battlefield domi-
68. Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21
(1985).
69. "During the 1970s and 1980s, laissez-faire law and economics scholars, perhaps recogniz-
ing the implications of Bork's observation to their normative agenda, cleverly used antitrust as a
beachhead to disseminate their vision-of impeccable supply and demand schedules and magi-
cally efficient common law-into other doctrinal areas." Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 745, 862 (2004).
70. Nominated by Ronald Reagan. Currently Chief Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago and a Senior Lecturer at and alumnus of the University
of Chicago Law School.
71. This position was taught by Henry Manne at intensive law and economics lecture sessions
aimed at federal judges. See Henry N. Butler, The Manne Programs in Economics for Federal
Judges, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351, 352 (1999) ("By 1990, approximately forty percent of the
sitting federal judges had completed Manne's flagship program[,] the Economics Institute for
Federal Judges"). Posner, Easterbrook, and Bork were all students of Manne. Id.
72. Namely that most regulation offered at common law was, knowingly or not, optimized
around increasing the efficiency of economic relationships between actors.
73. For examples of the Chicago School "pure efficiency" position during the Reagan era, see
generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
263 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (Basic Booksl978).
74. Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1231,
1239 (1998) (questioning the impact of Henry Manne's teachings on the federal jurisprudence of
the period).
75. JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 92-130 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1988).
76. Discussing law and economics "theory" as "laissez-faire" and "anti-regulatory." Norman
S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
289, 308 (2009).
77. The economic literature has migrated from Adam Smith's concept of the "natural" or
"just" wage to one of two approaches, which may or may not have the same result: 1) wages
should match the worker's marginal product of labor (the value the firm would gain with one
additional worker), or 2) wages should be set at the price that will clear the market. The debate
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nated by now decades-old arguments. Welfare became a race issue,
an urban-versus-suburban issue, and a class issue during the 1980s.
Appeals to economic experts allowed Republicans a way to propose
policies without confronting racial,78 urban-nonurban, and class
conflicts. 79
There are efficiency costs inherent in raising income through tradi-
tional welfare programs, through taxing and transferring wealth be-
tween socioeconomic classes, or through litigation.80 However, the
goal of the law cannot solely be "efficiency" 81 without any social
aim.8 2 While waste must be combated and resources marshaled, there
is no reason to believe that because efficiency is a desirable effect of
good lawmaking that it should be the paramount goal of lawmaking
generally.83
over wages today is far more a matter of applied mathematics than one of contemporary
philosophy.
78. Avoiding any discussion of existing racial inequality at t- that led to the present condition
at to is a continuing trend, supposing that every point in time is distinct and magically separate
from the events that came before. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, DEP'T OF LABOR, THE
NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965); see also Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) ("The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race").
79. See Alycee Lane, "Hang Them If They Have To Be Hung": Mitigation Discourse, Black
Families, and Racial Stereotypes, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 171, 194 (2009) (describing the Reagan-
era welfare mom stereotype, "a lazy, sexually promiscuous, and morally degenerate drain on the
national treasury, one who lives off the state's . . . white taxpayers"); Martha T. McCluskey,
Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND.
L.J. 783, 785-86 n.6 (2003).
80. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
81. The most extreme view is one that, even if efficiency were adopted as the sole purpose for
law, law could not serve this purpose. "The basic features of ecosystems and markets are not
controversial. No one versed in the ways of these systems would seriously propose to control the
population of butterflies or the price of duct tape. Yet result-oriented measures and practices
have become commonplace, not because the systems are misunderstood but because the role of
law is misconceived. Law is not able to dictate how . . . markets operate." Bruce Pardy, The
Hand Is Invisible, Nature Knows Best, and Justice Is Blind: Markets, Ecosystems, Legal Instru-
mentalism, and the Natural Law of Systems, 44 TULSA L. REV. 67, 67 (2008).
82. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1997) (noting
that efficiency is desirable but does not by itself make policy); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD
WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 13 (Polity Press ed., Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 1998)
(noting that many, for wholly political reasons, assert that welfare is "the source of all evils").
83. Jon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 311-12 (Dennis Pattersen ed., 1996) (noting that a "vast majority
of law and economics scholarship assumes without hesitation that the goal of law should be
efficiency").
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B. The Evolving Concept of Subsidy in Law and Economics
A subsidy, in the broadest sense, is a payment (or tax reduction)
from the government made with the intent to change the characteris-
tics of a particular market or set of markets. For instance, allowing
the price of a commodity to fall below net production cost enables the
indigent to buy goods and services without having to resort to begging
or crime. Subsidies are generally meant to incentivize positive behav-
ior, whether from market actors or from individual citizens.8 4 The
conservative law and economics opposition to subsidies like welfare
comes more from the lack of confidence that markets (and individu-
als) can be managed through specific incentives85 than from an oppo-
sition to the concept of welfare in the abstract. 86 More specifically,
many conservatives question whether the self-interest and the public
interest can be well enough aligned87 to achieve broader goals in the
marketplace. 8 Because this is a reasonable and discretely defensible
position,89 this welfare position has acted as a secure "home base"90
for other theories and proposals.91
C. Bank Bailouts and Nouveau-Interventionism:
What Would Chicago Do?
One of the largest subsidy plans of this young century has been the
decision for the federal government to become an equity stakeholder
in the nation's banking system. 92 This bailout may well run counter to
84. To encourage people to "work hard and play by the rules," as President Bill Clinton once
said. President's Radio Address, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 31-32 (Jan. 7, 1995).
85. For an in-depth examination of policies erected by Reagan-era law and economics devo-
tees, see Otis B. Grant, President Ronald Reagan and the African-American Community: Harm-
ful Stereotyping and Games of Choice in Market-Oriented Policy Reform, 25 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 57 (2008).
86. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTIL-
rrY, JEOPARDY (1991).
87. For a classic piece on the difficulty of managing incentives, see Steven Kerr, On The Folly
of Rewarding A While Hoping For B, 9 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 7 (1995).
88. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (1998)
(discussing incentive alignment).
89. The author is speaking here about the question of whether markets or people can be
managed with incentives, which often have unintended side effects.
90. See C. FRrrz FOLEY, HARVARD BUs. SCH., WELFARE PAYMENTS AND CRIME 18 (2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1089576 ("[W]elfare benefi-
ciaries exhaust their welfare related income soon after receiving it and then attempt to augment
their income with income from criminal activity").
91. See generally Amy L. Wax, Norm Change or Judicial Decree? The Courts, the Public, and
Welfare Reform, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45 (2009).
92. See Victor Vaugirard, Bank Bailouts and Political Instability, EUR. J. POL. ECoN. (2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=989261; Tanju Yorulmazer, Li-
quidity, Bank Runs and Bailouts: Spillover Effects During the Northern Rock Episode (Fed. Re-
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the traditional law and economics reason for efficiency, that down-
stream effects will be generally pro-consumer, principally in the form
of lower prices for goods and services.93 How much the bailout plan
costs in the long-run 94 is less the issue, but its underlying methodol-
ogy95 -particularly with a constitutional law professor from the Uni-
versity of Chicago in the White House- is far more interesting.
Early in the financial crisis, the Obama Administration crafted a
plan for the federal government to buy so-called "toxic" assets held by
major banks.96 The Obama Administration later abandoned this "of-
floading" policy for an "equity" policy where the banks would retain
ownership of their undesirable assets, but still be able to raise capital
from the government in a firm-to-shareholder relationship.97
To understand the financial crisis, one must understand the ends of
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, which in retrospect look like a
comparison between first-world and third-world emergency medicine.
Bear Stearns received assurances that, at an absolute minimum, its
donated vital organs would live on within JPMorgan Chase.98 Con-
serve Bank of N.Y., Working Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1107570; Yaron Leitner, Financial Networks: Contagion, Containment, and Pri-
vate Sector Bailouts, 60 J. FIN. 2925 (2005); Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, Bailout
Plan: $2.5 Trillion and a Strong U.S. Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at Al, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/business/economy/llbailout.html.
93. Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust
as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 587 (1986) ("[E]conomic analysis will ordinarily reveal that
... bailouts impose high costs on consumers").
94. See Zachery Kouwe, As Banks Repay Bailout Money, U.S. Sees a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/business/economy/31taxpayer.
html. But see Allan Sloan, TARP Bailout Money We Can Kiss Goodbye, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/04/news/economy/tarp-profits.fortune/index.htm?postversion=
2009080409; see also Robin Sidel & Deborah Solomon, Treasury Lets 10 Banks Repay $68 Billion
in Bailout Cash, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124455
528999797923.html.
95. Dan Wilchins, Citi Shares Could, Finally, See Solid Demand, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE58E84U20090915.
96. Eric Posner and 2008 Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman were quick to criticize the plan.
Krugman wrote, "Financial institutions that want to "get bad assets off their balance sheets" can
do that any time they like, by writing those assets down to zero - or by selling them at whatever
price they can. If we create a new institution to take over those assets, the $700 billion question
is, at what price? And I still haven't seen anything that explains how the price will be deter-
mined." See Eric Posner, Why should the government buy toxic assets?, http://www.volokh.com/
posts/1232381598.shtml (Jan. 19, 2009).
97. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. May Convert Banks' Bailouts to Equity Share, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/business/20bailout.html; Kevin
Drawbaugh & Donna Smith, U.S. Treasury Agrees Equity Stake in Bailout, REUTERS, Sept. 22,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN2248159520080922.
98. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Acts to Rescue Financial Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17fed.html; JPMorgan Completes
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versely, Lehman Brothers was left to drown in its own blood. 99 Al-
most nowhere does the idea of a monolithic, single opinion in law and
economics seem more ludicrous than in the operating rooms where
corporations die: the bankruptcy courts. The effect of differing eco-
nomic theories in the bankruptcy courts affects even healthy firms;
firms negotiating with sophisticated creditors are influenced by the ec-
onomics of how a bankruptcy would unfold, even if the firm never
files for bankruptcy.100
The application of law and economics principles to bankruptcy ap-
pears to span the entire philosophical spectrum. Some believe that
bankruptcy courts are market entities competing for business,101
others believe that bankruptcy is an efficiency mechanism optimized
around sorting out pre-existing obligations,102 while still others believe
bankruptcy courts are chiefly disruptive mechanisms.103 There are, of
course, views farther to the periphery expressed in the scholarship -
that law and economics principles dictate that Chapter 11 is either
wholly obsolete104 or a species of structured larceny. 05 One thing is
certain: there are inefficiencies, agency costs, and interim losses ab-
sorbed by parties and non-parties to a bankruptcy that are not mea-
sured by the traditional law and economics approach.106 Job losses,
Takeover of Bear Stearns, REUTERS, May 31, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/
idUSN3143823420080531.
99. Rethinking Lehman Brothers: The Consequences of Letting Lehman Fail, ECONOMIST, Oct.
2, 2008, http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story id=12342689; see also
James Surowiecki, Did Lehman Brothers' Failure Matter?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 9, 2009, http:/I
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/jamessurowiecki/2009/03/did-lehman-brot.html.
100. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD et al., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 232 (1998) ("Even if the
firm never files a bankruptcy petition, the course that negotiations take will be shaped by the
rights that parties [would] have in bankruptcy").
101. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1,
12 (2007) ("The change in bankruptcy practice was that the bankruptcy courts began competing
for big cases. The change in economic ideology was a growth in the influence of law and eco-
nomics among judges"); David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 624 (1989) ("[Florum shopping is treated by Jones as if it were an
inherent evil, but nothing is an inherent evil to the law-and-economics movement").
102. See Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 377-78
(1997) (as to liquidation agreements).
103. See Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 FLA. L. REV. 329, 356 n. 86 (1998)
(criticizing ex-post modifications to standing agreements).
104. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751, 785 (2002).
105. David Gray Carlson & Jack F. Williams, The Truth About the New Value Exception to
Bankruptcy's Absolute Priority Rule, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2000) ("The use of new
value plans by bankruptcy courts is highly suspect to the law-and-economics movement, which in
any case is convinced that Chapter 11 is legalized theft").
106. Prof. Nathalie D. Martin's 1998 article does an excellent job examining this issue in
depth. See Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests In Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside
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interim unemployment periods, and workers who cannot apply their
extant skill set to a new job, for example, all carry costs the society
must absorb. These costs are visible only if the bankruptcy is ex-
amined from non-creditor perspectives; they are invisible to creditors,
as most creditors will have vantage points on the bankruptcy similar to
each other. The Jacksonian creditor view107 is where the bankruptcy
is a process for creditors to buy greater clarity or certainty as to their
proceeds and excludes third-party costs by creating the illusion of a
bilateral exchange.108 Pretending that a creditor trades part of his
possible dollar for a certain return of twenty-five cents is to pretend
that the dollar existed in the first place. This fiction is a dangerous
one, as it supports the fallacy that the creditor and the debtor are still
dealing directly and are in a position to draw their own terms when
they are actually in an extra-market artificial space.109
Bankruptcy is one of many areas of law where the traditional,
straightforward application of microeconomic principles to law and
economics problems has begun to break down. The disagreement
over how to handle, ignore, or factor in these systemic costs is one of
the most important wedges cracking the consensus among law and ec-
onomics scholars. Specifically, when costs are imposed by a single
party on an opposing partyo and costs will surely be borne by a third-
party not represented, how can one insure this third-party does not
pay excess rents or become overburdened with what should be the
opposing party's costs? Further, is it relevant whether the costs are
pecuniary, health, environmental, diplomatic, present1 or
measurable? 112
Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429 (1998) (arguing law and economics models not sufficiently
inclusive of other societal costs involved in business failure).
107. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bar-
gain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
108. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bank-
ruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984).
109. There is some momentum in the law and economics movement toward using market rate
or auction rate valuations rather than judicial valuations in bankruptcy. This momentum has
thus far, however, mostly stayed safely contained in the scholarship and away from the bench.
See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 93-94 (1995).
110. "Opposing party" is used here to mean in litigation, in negotiation, or as a counterparty
to contract.
111. "Present" is used here as a measure of temporal proximity, as in present costs versus
deferred or not yet extant costs.
112. "Measurable" is used here to mean quantifiable in economic terms.
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V. THE MODERN ERA: THE MYTH OF CONSENSUS SHATrERS
Rather than a learning," 3 evolving network, the law and economics
community turned into a Balkanized muddle in 2009. During the
2008-09 bailout,114 even Reagan-era law and economics voices were
not speaking in unison. 15 Similarly, during the 2009 debate over
whether there should be a "public option" in the health insurance
market, many law and economics scholars of the old and new genera-
tions' 16 disagreed." 7 Unfortunately, this momentary fracture in the
113. For law and economics to remain a favored approach, it must outperform other ap-
proaches. See generally Peter M. Senge, The Leader's New Work: Building Learning Organiza-
tions, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 1990, at 7 (citing collective learning in organizations as modern
source of competitive advantage).
114. This is part of a troubling, continuous cycle that has been seen in the mining industry, the
steel industry, the airline industry, and now the banking industry. Capital markets cannot exist
without the state. When markets exhaust available credit, capital, and resources, the state bails
out the industry in question. Then, once the industry is bailed out and prosperous, there is a
push for the very deregulation that enabled an accumulation of risk in the sector in the first
place.
115. Kathryn Spier and John C. Coates at Harvard, both of whom exited graduate school
around the time Reagan exited office, have voiced a variety of opinions on the current financial
industry predicament. Spier, a former visiting professor at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business and Olin Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School, focuses her recent
scholarship on insolvency and bankruptcy; law and economics scholars viewing the crisis through
this lens may have more difficulty parsing Bear Stearns-style outcomes than Lehman Brothers
"do not resuscitate" outcomes. Coates was initially skeptical of the bailout plan, doubting
bailout funds would reach lending operations within large banks. For a webcast video describing
Coates's early thoughts on the plan, see John C. Coates, How "The Bailout is Robbing the
Banks," http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/business-law/related/07_bailout.html (May 8,
2009). He has since (in his July 29, 2009 testimony before the Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance and Investment and in related written
testimony) focused on the problem within banks being procedural (his recommendations now
include considering separating the Chairman and CEO positions at large firms, for instance) and
incentives-centric rather than focusing on internal inefficiencies or intra-organizational resource
allocation problems.
116. The new generation here refers to the generation after Becker and Posner, scholars
whose graduate school experiences came under a Republican administration, during the Reagan
era or in the post-Reagan Bush years.
117. Simon Johnson and James Kwak, founders of The Baseline Scenario, wrote a piece in
favor of health care reform in the Washington Post, likening arguments against a public option to
arguments opposing Medicare. Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Don't Want a Public Plan? Well,
What Do You Think of Medicare?, WASH. PosT, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/25/AR2009082501075.html. Jean Abraham of the University of
Minnesota quickly noted that the public option would not have the same economic effects as a
complete takeover, a la Medicare. See Scott Goldberg, At The Heart of the Debate: The Public
Option, KARE, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.karell.com/news/news-article.aspx?storyid=823975&
catid=391. Richard M. Thaler of the University of Chicago was particularly doubtful of the pub-
lic option's positive economic effects, writing that it "is neither necessary nor sufficient for
achieving the real goals of reform, and those goals are too important to risk losing the war."
Richard H. Thaler, A Public Option Isn't a Curse, or a Cure, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 2009, at BU.
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law and economics phalanx fostered less intellectual heterogeneity
than one might expect.
A. When Things Got Blurry
While law and economics may well be "arguably, the most impor-
tant development in legal scholarship in the last hundred years,"118
what law and economics stands for, or should stand for, is an open
question in the current environment. The late 1990s yielded a few
voices of dissent,' 19 notably from Professor Nussbaum at the Univer-
sity of Chicago.120 These writings went beyond the earlier, tamer criti-
ques in scholarship from the Reagan era.121
Still, none deal directly with dismantling the central myth of law
and economics: the efficient bilateral exchange. The reason the actor
in the law and economics devotees' hypotheticals can contract around
problems and inefficiencies is simple: this actor is magically familiar
with the single counterparty or group of constituent counterparties
with whom to contract. However, this ignores the types of bargains
that are not well-suited to bilateral dealing.122 In many situations, the
parties to be dealt with are either too numerouS 123 or too uncertainl 24
to be bargained with. In other situations, a market-clearing price
would have within it what many law and economics scholars would
consider unacceptable inefficiencies. 125
118. Geoffrey Miller, Tribute to Judge Richard A. Posner, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 13, 13
(2005).
119. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques
of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZo L. REV. 431 (1996).
120. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particu-
lar Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997); see also The University of Chicago, The
Law School, Faculty, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/nussbaum/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
121. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value?, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 237-40
(1985).
122. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency, and the Promise- of Decisional Equity: From
Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 935, 938 (2009) ("The 'goods' bought and sold in the
quasi-markets of law and economics - contract breach, levels of care, criminal activity - are pro-
foundly different from, say, buying a ton of soy beans. In these markets, contract rights, careless-
ness, and criminal behavior are viewed as subject to demand and supply").
123. In the case of contracting around a large toxic tort issue, for instance.
124. In the case of contracting around a securities fraud issue, for instance.
125. An agreement to contract around any need for litigation in the case of Hurricane Katrina
losses, for instance.
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B. Does Richard Posner Love Anacott Steel?126
The regulation of insider trading, or lack thereof,127 continues to be
a difficult question in the law and economics universe.128 Fundamen-
tal premises remain in dispute, as some scholars in the area view in-
sider trading as a beneficial activity,129 while others see insider trading
as harmful, hurting the integrity of equity prices and (if seen in great
volume) the liquidity of markets.130 Even economists with similar ac-
ademic backgrounds and similar policy goals, who agree that effi-
ciency is a central goal of laws and market regulations, cannot agree
whether insider trading increases or decreases efficiency.131 Nor can
legal scholars agree as to what degree even narrowly-defined opportu-
nities for insider trading should be policed 32 on efficiency or other
grounds.
An interesting facet of the insider trading debate is its core similar-
ity to the welfare debate and the healthcare debate: many wonder
whether the public interest can be well-aligned with the incentives
given to individuals. Various scholars argue that allowing insider trad-
ing creates a distraction,133 increases risky behavior,134 and encour-
126. With apologies to Stanley Weiser and Oliver Stone. Anacott Steel is the name of a
fictional company in the film WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
127. Illegal trading being separate and apart from trading that may not comply with social
norms. See Karl T. Muth, The Fragile Armistice: The Legal, Economic, and Policy Implications
of Trading in a Competitor's Stock, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 611, 631-33 (2009) (discussing impact of
regulation and social norms).
128. See generally Kristoffel R. Grechenig, The Marginal Incentive of Insider Trading: An Eco-
nomic Reinterpretation of the Case Law, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 75 (2006).
129. See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing
in favor of insider trading as a species of performance-based compensation); Dennis W. Carlton
& Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983) (arguing
that insider trading increases firm value). Milton Friedman, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, and
others have written in favor of very limited insider trading regulation or no regulatory interven-
tion as to insider trading at all.
130. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World:
An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237,
240 (2007).
131. See id. at 237-40 (summarizing the traditional arguments presented by Coase and others).
132. Cf Alison G. Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV.
341 (1982). Compare Karl T. Muth, With Avarice Aforethought: Insider Trading and 1Ob5-1
Plans, 9 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) with Allan Horwich, The Origin, Application,
Validity, and Potential Misuse of Rule 1Ob5-1, 62 THE Bus. LAw. 913 (2007), available at http://
www.schiffhardin.com/binary/horwichbl_0507.pdf. See also Alexander P. Robbins, The Rule
10b5-1 Loophole: An Empirical Study (May 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=941238.
133. See generally Boyd Kimball Dyer, Economic Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Mar-
kets, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1 (theorizing that managers would become more focused on trading
than on managing operations); c.f OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND Busi-
NESS BEHAVIOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION FORM ON ENTERPRISE BE-
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ages corporate officers to attempt to manipulate the market through
news135 or other avenues.136 What is really at issue, however, is who
might be a party to the transaction. If one believes the executive in-
volved in the trade and the person from whom the executive buys the
stock (or sells it to) are the only parties, then it is a bilateral transac-
tion in need of little analysis beyond whether the statutes in force at
that time permit the trade. If, however, one believes the firm's other
shareholders, the firm's bondholders, the exchange on which the firm
trades, and society at large are parties potentially affected by the
transaction, one may be more reluctant to approve of insider
trading.137
C. Contract Around Baby Right Round138
If it is possible to routinely contract around scenarios such as class
action litigation and bankruptcy, then these types of proceedings
should be ground zero for these complex contract maneuvers. The
problem here is twofold: (1) attorneys with litigation experience are
skilled at settlement, which is distinguishable from dealmaking, 139 and
(2) outside financing is almost always needed to make the bargain mu-
tually acceptable. 140 Hence, even though class actions and bankrupt-
HAVIOR 95 (1970) (theorizing managers would become reclusive traders, gathering and hoarding
insider information about the firm).
134. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 309 (1981).
135. See Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967); c.f Holger Daske, Scott A. Richardson & A. Irem
Tuna, Do Short Sale Transactions Precede Bad News Events? (Oct. 18, 2005) (unpublished man-
uscript), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=722242 (examining data covering 4,193 NYSE-
listed securities and finding no substantial correlation between short sale transactions and signifi-
cant negative news events, inconsistent with earlier work suggesting private information's being
among primary drivers of short sale behavior).
136. See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the
Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051-52 (1982).
137. Cf Eli Ofek & Matthew Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock
Prices, 58 J. FIN. 1113 (2003) (asserting that third parties were harmed in the Internet stock
selloffs); see also Norman S. Douglas, Insider Trading: The Case Against the "Victimless Crime"
Hypothesis, 23 FIN. REV. 127 (1988); see generally Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 727 (1988).
138. With apologies to Pete Burns. DEAD OR ALIVE, YOUTHQUAKE (Epic 1985).
139. Dealmaking here refers to business negotiations where the parties' relationship is de-
fined by a mutually beneficial bargain of pecuniary value. This is different in many ways from
settlement negotiations where the parties are linked by an interest in accelerating the resolution
of a legal dispute.
140. Even within the resilient cocoon of bankruptcy protection, outside financing is usually
needed in order for the firm to emerge with creditors satisfied. See Brian Tumulty, History
Shows Corporations Can Survive Bankruptcy, USA TODAY, June 1, 2009, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2009-05-29-gm-surviving-bankruptcyN.htm (quoting Randal
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cies are likely not ideally efficient for both parties, they may remain
the preferred (yet more inefficient) means of dispute resolution.141
Despite decades of scholarship suggesting that contracting around
inefficient rules and processes should be common, 142 there are few, if
any, examples of a Baird-Rasmussen contract bankruptcy. 143 The au-
thor has been unable to unearth a single class action with a bet-the-
firm dollar valuel 44 that was resolved in a Baird-Rasmussen-esque ne-
gotiation rather than through traditional settlement negotiations or
mediation processes.145  Nor are there any Harvard Business School
case studies1 46 where a stated strategy or proposed solution is to con-
tract around1 47 an imminent legal process, the goal being to avoid ex-
posing the firm to judgment creditors or creditors in bankruptcy.
VI. Two OF MANY BLIND SPOTS
Since the mid-1990s, many important innovations in investments
and finance have come from politically progressive economists, entre-
preneurs, and financial institutions. These innovations include
microfinance and socially-responsible investing and are part of a
growing network of financial products, institutions, and practices that
Picker of the University of Chicago) (relevant excerpt also available at http://www.law.uchicago.
edu/node/970).
141. For commentary regarding why a party might fail to contract around a rule or process
that is not ideal, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 670-76 (1998).
142. Cf Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 85 (2003).
143. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55
STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002) (contending that network of contractual obligations, negotiated
outside any traditional creditor protection, could replace entire bankruptcy process).
144. In other words, a lawsuit with a value representing a substantial portion of the market
capitalization of the firm in question.
145. This may have to do, in part, with how the firm views itself - as a repository for share-
holder value or, instead, as a managerial or operational hierarchy. See William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1475-76 (1989). But see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Con-
tract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1422-28 (1989). In either case, there are disincentives associated
with unconventional private contract resolution.
146. There are many opportunities in the Harvard Business School case portfolio to apply a
Baird-Rasmussen approach, but this possibility is never mentioned or alluded to in any case as a
viable solution. See, e.g., Daniel B. Bergstresser, Robin Greenwood & James Quinn, Washington
Mutual's Covered Bonds (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin. Unit, Working Paper Series, Case No. 209-093,
2009). Other Harvard cases present scenarios well-suited to trying a Baird-Rasmussen solution,
but do not pose questions compatible with this approach. See, e.g., William E. Fruhan, Jr., State
Street Corporation (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin. Unit., Working Paper Series, Case No. 209-112,
2009). But see Krishna G. Palepu, Suraj Srinivasan & Aldo Sesia, Jr., New Century Financial
Corporation (Harvard Bus. Sch., Case No. 109-034, 2008).
147. Note that this concept of "contracting around" a legal process entirely is different from
reaching a settlement acceptable to the various parties.
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would not have arisen from the usual law and economics efficiency-
centric analysis.
The current neoliberal law and economics movement is focused on
a small universe of concepts applied broadly, rather than a large uni-
verse of ideas with applications particular and peculiar to the problem
at hand. As a result, many ideas are in the "blind spot" of those who
have internalized classic law and economics assumptions. The very
brief discussion, infra, is meant to provide two examples of ideas and
solutions that likely would not be reached through traditional law and
economics approaches, rather than detailed explanations of each.
This discussion's purpose is to show that these law and economics
"blind spots" are not only interesting in the abstract, but also detri-
mental in practice to working economists and institutions.
A. Microcredit
Despite years of discussion in the neoliberal scholarship about em-
powering the poor1 48 rather than merely distributing assets to them
through government social programs and taxation, the idea of a
microfinance system149 driven by social businesso50 did not emerge15 1
from the neoliberal establishment. 152 Instead, microfinance institu-
tions sprouted from the regions and markets that needed them
most, 53 not because of government intervention 154 or teams of for-
148. For a political history in this area starting with President Johnson's war on poverty and
pledge of a "hand up" rather than a "hand out," see William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare
Rights: A History, Critique, and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1847-52 (2001). For
a survey of (primarily conservative-led) welfare reform implementations that narrowed pro-
grams rather than providing credit or encouraging entrepreneurship, see JUDITH M. GUERON &
EDWARD PAULY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK (1991).
149. For information on microcredit broadly, see Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and Financial
Development, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 271 (2005); see also Jameel Jaffer, Microfinance and the
Mechanics of Solidarity Lending: Improving Access to Credit Through Innovations in Contract
Structure, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 184 (1999) (noting low default rates are typical
within successful programs).
150. See generally Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has Mis-
perceived the Grameen Bank's Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 217 (2005).
151. See Aaron Jones, Note, Promotion of a Commercially-Viable Microfinance Sector in
Emerging Markets, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187 (2006).
152. See Tatiana Sullivan, What The World Can Teach America, 6 Bus. L. BRIEF 43, 44-47
(2009).
153. See generally Marcella David, What Now, Kemo Sabe?, 55 BuFF. L. REV. 307, 310-17
(2007) (reviewing WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS
To AID THE REST HAVE DONE So MUCH ILL AND So LrrrLE GOOD (2006)); JANET LANDA,
TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC
TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1994).
154. Cf Elin M. King, Vietnam's Decree On Microfinance: A Flawed Attempt to Create an
Enabling Legal Environment for Microfinance, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 187, 189-93 (2008).
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eign-trained economists. 55 Microfinance, as a trend and an industry,
continues to grow, creating a new body of scholarship 56 and at-
tracting top talent.'57
The hurdle that prevented microfinance from being practicable for
most of Western history -high transaction costs- was removed in the
latter part of the twentieth century by automation, the Internet, and
more efficiency around small transactions both within countries and
internationally. Not surprisingly, the neoliberal law and economics es-
tablishment that discounts the importance of transaction cost in other
areas did not notice when transaction costs dropped to a point where
sustainable large-scale microfinance was feasible. This may explain, at
least in part, the failure of the law and economics community to notice
the potential and scalability of microfinance models until rather late in
the game.
B. Social Investment
The concept of social investment (socially responsible portfolio
management on the funds side; social venture investing on the private
equity and venture capital side) is one of alignment: better aligning
the investor's interests with the interests of the corporations' in which
he or she invests capital. Despite being an apparently simple, bilateral
exchange causing better incentive alignment,158 this type of investing
155. See James M. Cooper, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 501, 521-24 (2008) (discussing Chicago Boys
in Chile); see also Gary Becker, Latin America Owes A Lot To Its 'Chicago Boys', Bus. WK.,
June 9, 1997 (positive description of Chicago Boys influence in Chile). But see Enrique R. Car-
rasco, Autocratic Transitions To Liberalism: A Comparison of Chilean and Russian Structural
Adjustment, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 99, 111 (1995) (describing technocrats in
Russia).
156. See, e.g., Ian Davis, Rural Banking: Designing An Effective Legal Framework for
Microfinance, 2 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 394 (2009).
157. Grameen Bank, a leading microfinance institution, was founded by Mohammad Yunus, a
Bangladeshi economist with whom it shares a 2006 Nobel Prize. Grameen continues to recruit
top talent, including Paul Maritz, CEO of VMware Corporation and a former senior Microsoft
executive who now serves as Chair of the Grameen Foundation. See Grameen Foundation,
Board of Directors, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/who-we-are/peoplelboard-of-directors
(last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
158. Both bilateral exchange models and positive incentive correlation are favored by the
neoliberal law and economics movement, as discussed supra. In addition, investors' increased
awareness and education about the operational realities of the firms in which they invest should
bring more information into the market, creating more accurate price levels for equities. How-
ever, many neoliberals were slow to warm to socially-responsible investing, possibly due to its
philosophical connection to environmentalism (a source of regulatory inefficiency), despite envi-
ronmental concerns being only one of many concerns socially-responsible portfolio management
might address (labor standards in countries playing host to major operations, treatment of work-
ers, equity structure, bonus structure, internal incentives, executive compensation, handling of
products liability litigation being other examples).
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was seen as an inefficient curiosity by many in the establishment, an
artifact of mid-1990s dabbling by liberal trustifarian twenty-someth-
ings and the dot-com naffs. Now, the industry around socially-respon-
sible investing has grown substantially (to over two trillion U.S.
dollars) and continues to grow each year.159 Funds using socially-re-
sponsible screens160 still have much room to grow, representing just
over 2% of mutual fund assets in the United States three years ago.161
Still, many in the law and economics movement have shown little in-
terestl62 in the area of socially-responsible 63 investing.164
The majority of law and economics scholars failed to see this trend
until it was well-established, at least in part, because mainstream
(which is to say neoliberal) law and economics scholars look narrowly
at economic efficiency, specifically efficiencies achieved in bilateral
dealing. When conceiving of bilateral counterparty relationships, an
economist considers a group of parties in subsets of two, in pairs, with
all benefits and efficiencies accruing to the counterparties. Because of
this bilateral conception bias, preferences of third parties and harm to
159. See Social Investment Forum, Socially Responsible Investing Facts, http://www.
socialinvest.org/resources/sriguide/srifacts.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2010)
160. A "screen" is the industry term for a filter the investor or fund manager places to limit
investments in a given portfolio, segment, or allocation. For instance, an investor might only
want to invest in domestic companies if they do not have a substantial history of minimum wage
violations. The firms excluded by their past minimum wage violations would then be "screened"
and not permitted to be part of the investment strategy, even if these firms presented strong
financials or appeared to be a good value.
161. Jonathan Dee, A Toy Maker's Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007 § 6, at 34.
162. Rather, the central figures of the law and economics movement have consistently pushed
the needle to the other end of the gauge, demonstrating their indifference to the social implica-
tions of economically-efficient models, whether auctioning babies (as a replacement for the
adoption process), legalizing dueling (as an economically-efficient dispute resolution methodol-
ogy), or allowing women to auction their right to choose (selling abortions as a bid-to-exercise
option contract, where churches, boyfriends, and others would try to outbid one another, deter-
mining whether the option of abortion was exercised). See, e.g., Richard Posner & Elisabeth M.
Landes, The Economics of the Baby Shortage: A Modest Proposal, 7 J. LEGAL S ruo. 323 (1978).
Given these positions, it would be logically inconsistent to not support, for instance Natalie Dy-
lan's right to auction her virginity on eBay in 2008. Student Auctions Virginity, Sparks Online
Debate, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSSP124114200
80911. But see Miriam R. Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud Should Be Regu-
lated, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 575, 614 n.175 (2002). See also Virginity Auction Ends On Net, BBC
NEWS, Feb. 9, 2004, http://www.newsbbc.co.uk/1/hilengland/bristol/3473817.stm; Web Suitor Bids
1 251,000 for Bride, BBC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2002, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hilengland/1788714.stm.
163. The University of Chicago Booth School of Business does not offer, and has never of-
fered, a portfolio management or finance course focused on investments made in deals or firms
that are socially-responsible.
164. Fuller-Thaler, an investment firm with Professor Richard Thaler of the University of Chi-
cago on its investment team, lists its seven investment strategies on its website, none of which
consider the social responsibility of the investments made. See Fuller & Thaler, http://www.
fullerthaler.com/people/richard-thaler.aspx? (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
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third parties are not a major consideration; hence, social responsibility
as to third parties has not been a major consideration of neoliberal
law and economics work.
VII. THE BIRTH OF A HETERODOX LAW &
ECONOMICS MOVEMENT
The existing law and economics movement has spread from areas
where there is a clear interplay between law and economic issues
(property 65 and contract law' 66), to areas where the use of economic
principles to solve legal questions is less obvious (adoption and bank-
ruptcyl 67), and finally to areas that are primarily political questions or
matters of policy (whether insider trading should be legal, whether a
merger or acquisition should receive additional scrutiny, how many
choices a health care plan should include). So pervasive is the global
influence of law and economics that there is a Department of Eco-
nomic Law at Beheshty University in Iran.168 Meanwhile, the law and
economics movement has lost sight of a greater concept of equity 6 9
and heavily discounted the soft inputs17 0 that might make a world seen
through a "law and economics" lens more realistic.
The staunchest supporters of law and economics today believe eco-
nomic calculations will supplant the history, social norms, and prece-
dent that shape law today. However, the very issues law and
economics seeks to minimize or ignore are those it does not ade-
165. For a recent example of a court applying law and economics principles, see Burns v. PA
Dep't of Correction, 544 F.3d 279, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2008) (appellate court attempting to derive
utility and value from facts; noting that "the 'language of economics' is not simply useful but
highly germane because it allows us to objectively measure and describe the economic result of a
particular action").
166. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEx. L.
REV. 1581, 1603-04 (2005); see also Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty
Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. J. Comp. L. 427 (1995).
167. While the resolution of a bankruptcy is most certainly an economic activity, bankruptcy
occurs within the protection of specialized, codified rules and state laws, not within a market
environment. See CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 128-29
(1984).
168. Yadollah Dadgar of Beheshty University, who keeps a working paper entitled Law and
Economics from a Moderate Islamic [P]erspective, and others in the near east have explored
applications of law and economics in recent years. See Yadollah Dadgar, Law and Economics
from a Moderate Islamic Perspective (UC Berkeley, Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper,
2009), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=12 4 1&context=blewp.
169. Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 356 (1990) (noting that many have criticized law and economics
scholars for associating "efficiency" with "fairness," when the two are often not correlated
positively).
170. See John Veilleux, Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1989 (1987).
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quately describe, such as considerations of equity,171 unforeseen harm
to third parties, and scenarios in which the underlying rational choice
assumption falls apart.17 2 So long as law and economics remains a
method for examining1 73 legal ruleS174 rather than becoming a new set
of rules in itself, the current role of law and economics will likely have
a positive effect. Beyond the judiciary, where this framework cannot
account for the range of operative variables, the application of ne-
oliberal law and economics principles offers diminishing utility. In
these places, the use of law and economics of any flavor or political
persuasion as a universal explanation for human or market behavior
must be circumscribed.
There must be a push to adjust and perfect models rather than
merely discounting the importance of their flaws. The sometimes-dif-
ficult-to-quantify realities of the world, including the large burden of
transaction costs and the possibility of harm to third-parties, must
have a place in future models if these models are to offer maximum
utility. Lastly, the actor in question cannot be replaced by the rational
actor as easily as one replaces the actor with the reasonable person in
common law tort. The world of law and economics must value au-
thenticity over simplicity, accuracy over art, and must depict a place
where different actors are motivated by different incentives -not all of
which are rational, proportional, or reasonable.
171. Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1315-16 (1990) (illustrat-
ing, using game theory, that various conditions with positive effects on the health of a market do
not have positive effects on related social welfare factors).
172. For instance, if the operative assumption is that all actors are rational, it becomes quite
challenging to create working models for criminal law, given the inherent limits of the law and
economics toolbox. See William J. Barnes, Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a Compre-
hensive Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, 74 INo. L.J. 627, 628 (1999).
173. Note that "examining" is materially different from "interpreting." While it is appropriate
to test and experiment with legal rules using economic analysis, economic principles should not
be used to interpret laws that were not crafted with economic considerations in mind. See John
Cirace, When Are Law and Economics Isomorphic?, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 183, 214
(2009) ("[I]f a court adopts the goal of efficiency as its guide in cases . . . law and economics will
be isomorphic because judges will tend to interpret legal concepts consistently with economic
concepts").
174. See Theodore Eisenberg, Why do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1741, 1742 (2004).
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